Duquesne Law Review
Volume 14
Number 4 Symposium on Energy and the
Environment: Is Coal the Key to the Solution?

Article 9

1976

The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969: Its Impact
on Safety and Coal Production
Ralph E. Bailey

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ralph E. Bailey, The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969: Its Impact on Safety and Coal
Production, 14 Duq. L. Rev. 671 (1976).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol14/iss4/9

This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969: Its Impact on Safety and Coal Production
Ralph E. Bailey*
I.

INTRODUCTION

On December 30, 1969, President Richard M. Nixon signed into
law the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.' This law
and the regulations and interpretations which have accumulated in
its wake have become the most complex, comprehensive safety legislation ever to be enacted in the United States.'
The Act and the regulations encompass all aspects and phases of
underground and surface coal mining. There are literally hundreds
of mandatory health and safety standards applicable to underground mines and a similar number applicable to surface mines.'
Safety standards deal with roof support, ventilation, removal of
combustible materials, rock dusting, inspection and maintenance of
electrical equipment, blasting and explosives, fire protection, canopies and cabs on certain equipment, sealing of mines, hoisting and
transportation of men and equipment, illumination, and virtually
*

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Consolidation Coal Company, Pittsburgh, Penn-

sylvania.
1. Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1970), as amended
(Supp. V, 1975)) [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
2. Under § 101(a) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 811(a) (1970), the Secretary of the Interior is
responsible for developing, promulgating and revising, as may be appropriate, improved
mandatory safety standards for the protection of life and the prevention of injuries in coal
mines and for promulgating the mandatory health standards transmitted to him by the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. The Secretary of HEW is responsible under §
101(d), 30 U.S.C. § 811(d) (1970), for developing and revising, as may be appropriate, improved mandatory health standards for the protection of life and the prevention of occupational diseases of miners. The mandatory health and safety standards which have been
promulgated in accordance with the Act are set forth in 30 C.F.R. pts. 70, 71, 75, 77 (1975).
3. The mandatory safety and health standards applicable to underground coal mines and
surface areas of underground coal mines cover approximately 170 pages in the Code of Federal
Regulations, title 30. For all mandatory health and safety standards, see Mandatory Health
Standards-Underground Coal Mines, 30 C.F.R. §§ 70.1-.510 (1975); Mandatory Health
Standards-Surface Work Areas of Underground Coal Mines and Surface Coal Mines, id. §§
71.1-.603; Mandatory Safety Standards-Underground Coal Mines, id. §§ 75.1-.1808; Mandatory Safety Standards, Surface Coal Mines and Surface Work Areas of Underground Coal
Mines, id. §§ 77.1-.1916.
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every other aspect of mining.4 Health standards primarily are directed to the control of respirable coal dust and noise, but include
much more.5 The broad-based law requires coal operators to comply
with an almost countless number of regulations, which are subject
to constant review and changes, with new provisions added from
time to time.' The Secretary of the Interior is charged with the
responsibility for administering and enforcing the Act and the regulations. Enforcement activity is carried out by inspectors of the
Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration (MESA),' with
8
enforcement powers as set forth in the Act.
This attempt by the federal government to improve mine safety
through legislation has caused profound changes in the day-to-day
operation of the nation's bituminous coal mines. However, there is
ample and conclusive evidence after six years that the Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act has not been the basis of any substantial improvement in the safety of bituminous coal mines. While it
has failed in its intended mission, it has produced some unintended
consequences which are of grave concern to the coal industry-compliance with the numerous provisions of the law has resulted in substantial reduction in coal production and in worker
productivity.
These counter-productive consequences come at the worst possible time for America. The nation desperately needs to develop its
domestic energy resources at an accelerated rate to meet the tremendously increased demand for energy which has been forecast,
and to reduce our dependence-and thus our economic and military
vulnerability-on foreign nations which now supply more than 40
percent of our energy needs.
Coal is America's most abundant energy resource and its most
promising hope for meeting future demand and for reducing dependence on foreign suppliers. Coal development must not be
4. Id. §§ 75.1-.1808, 77.1-.1916.
5. Id. §§ 70.1-.510, 71.1-.603.
6. 30 U.S.C. §§ 811(a), (d) (1970).
7. The Secretary of the Interior originally was to carry out the enforcement activity
through the Bureau of Mines, an agency of the Department of the Interior. HousE COMM. ON
EDUCATION AND LABOR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: FEDERAL COAL MINE HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT,

H.R. REP. No. 563, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 635 (1969) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY]. However, that function was subsequently transferred to MESA. 38 Fed. Reg.
18695-96 (1973).
8. 30 U.S.C. § 814 (1970).
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unnecessarily constrained-by the 1969 Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act or by any other legislation or regulation that impedes
production without providing commensurate benefits.
The apparent dissatisfaction of Congress with the Bureau of
Mines' efforts to improve health and safety of coal miners, triggered
by the Farmington, West Virginia, mine disaster of November 20,
1968, seems to have been the circumstance which led to the enactment of the 1969 Act. The Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare cited the "notably unimpressive record by the Department
of the Interior and its Bureau of Mines in respect to improving the
health and safety of miners" prior to the Farmington disaster., The
committee stated that in the 17 years following enactment of the
Federal Coal Mine Safety Act of 1952,10 miner health and safety had
been the "stepchild" of the Bureau." The committee made it clear
that the new Act would demand that the health and safety functions
of the Bureau be substantially expanded and improved."2
II.

IMPACT OF THE ACT ON SAFETY: PHYSICAL CONDITION OF MINES VS.
WORKERS' ATTITUDES

Following enactment of the 1969 law, the Department of the Interior substantially increased its enforcement effort, which was reflected in an increase in the number of inspectors and the number
of inspections. In 1969, department enforcement personnel numbered 305, and approximately 7,130 inspections were conducted.'" In
1975, the department numbered 1,404 enforcement personnel and
conducted 74,393 mine inspections."
While it is clear that enforcement activities have been expanded
because of the Act, the degree to which the Act has accomplished
its basic objective-with the exception of some provisions which
have been beneficial-is open to doubt. The bituminous coal industry's safety record has not improved significantly since the Act was
passed. For the eleven years prior to passage of the Act (1959
9. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 42.
10. Act of July 16, 1952, ch. 877, §§ 1-4, 66 Stat. 692.
11. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 42-43.
12. Id. at 43.
13. Statistics from Office of Assistant Administrator, Coal Mine Health and Safety, Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration, Arlington, Virginia, April 15, 1976 [hereinafter
cited as Statistics, Office of Assistant Administrator].
14. Id.
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through 1969), the average lost-time accident frequency rate per
million man-hours worked in the industry was approximately 42.1
For the six years following enactment (1970 through 1975), the average lost-time accident frequency rate per million man-hours worked
in the industry was approximately 40.16
This obvious deficiency in the achievement of the Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act's goal to improve miner safety primarily results from the Act's approach to the problem-regulating the
physical condition of the mines. Studies by Consolidation Coal
Company indicate that only 15 percent of lost-time accidents in
underground mines are caused by the physical condition of the
mines, i.e., conditions covered by provisions of the Act. The remaining 85 percent of lost-time accidents are caused by human error. The
1969 Act does not address itself sufficiently to these causes.
The basic difference between a safe and an unsafe mine usually
is the mental attitude toward safety of the people who work in it. A
high level of safety awareness and safety consciousness, based on
proper and sufficient safety training, is the best insurance that the
physical condition of the mine and its operation will be consistent
with optimum safety standards. Mental attitudes regarding safe
working practices are not changed by anything so simple as the force
of law. Positive attitudes regarding safety can only be instilled
through intensive safety training and motivation. This contention
seems to be borne out by the experience of the Consolidation Coal
Company during the last four years.
Although the company's safety record had been considerably better than the national average for the coal industry (e.g., 14.1 losttime accident frequency rate per million man-hours 7 versus 39.2 for
the industry" during the past five years), Consolidation dedicated
itself to the task of making its mines as safe as possible. To accomplish this objective, the company in 1972 embarked on an expanded,
redirected program to reduce mine accidents through safety training
and education of all mine personnel. Corporate and divisional safety
department personnel were doubled to nearly 250. They were given
15. National Coal Association, COAL FACTS 1974-1975, MANPOWER & SAFETY 89 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as COAL FACTS].
16. Id.; Statistics from National Coal Association, Washington, D.C.
17. Statistics compiled by Corporate Safety Department, Consolidation Coal Company,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania [hereinafter cited as Consolidation Statistics].
18. COAL FACTS, supra note 15, at 89; Statistics from National Coal Association, Washington, D.C.
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the responsibility for establishing safety programs and procedures,
formulating and implementing safe work instructions for various
mining tasks, motivating employees toward reduction of accidents,
and insuring enforcement of the company's corporate safety policy.
Each employee was given an average of 24 hours of formal classroom safety instruction in such key subjects as first aid, emergency
rescue techniques, preventing roof falls, ventilation in underground
mines, and provisions of the federal Act. Equally as important,
standardized safety procedures for performing each separate mining
task were developed and miners performing these tasks were instructed in these procedures. No miner was permitted to begin work
until he had completed the safety procedure instruction course for
that assignment. Foremen were instructed and expected to promote
and teach safety to their crews so that the educational process would
continue outside the formal classroom. Booklets, literature and
other safety reminders were prepared and distributed to employees
and their families by the Safety, Employee Relations, and Public
Relations Departments of the company. Fire drills and complete
mine evacuation drills were conducted, weekly safety meetings were
held, and many other personal contacts were made between safety
instructors and mineworkers in an all-out effort to insure that the
safety programs reached every worker.
The results were dramatic. The company's lost-time accident frequency rate was reduced from 23.5 per million man-hours in 1972
to 11.3 per million man-hours in 1973. The reduction continued in
1974 when the accident frequency rate was 7.89; the accident frequency rate rose slightly in 1975 to 8.33.11 Similarly, the fatality
frequency rate dropped significantly from .88 per million man-hours
worked in 1972 to .16 per million man-hours worked in 1975.20 The
19. Consolidation Statistics, supra note 17.
20. Id. Appreciation of the effort involved requires some basic knowledge of the costs
incurred. During 1975, Consolidation committed $7.5 million to safety training (approximately $350 per employee), more than double the amount that was spent in 1973. This cost
does not include the value of coal that was not produced due to miner participation in training
programs.
Safety is an integral and inseparable part of coal mining. It is essential that employees
recognize that efficient coal production is accident-free production and that good safety
records and good production records go together. We at Consolidation have focused special
attention on the line supervisor who has the most day-in and day-out contact with employees
and their work attitudes. His attitude toward safety has a great influence on mine workers
under his direction. Safety leadership is an absolute requisite, from the man at the very top
to the "red hat," or miner-trainee.
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sharp reduction in Consolidation's accident frequency and fatality
frequency rates, as a result of the intensified safety program, is
encouraging. It is the best evidence we have that the decision to
place strong emphasis on training and motivation was sound.
III.

IMPACT OF THE ACT ON PRODUCTION AND PRODUCTIVITY

The coal industry cannot be opposed to legislation and regulations which serve to improve the health and safety of miners. There
is a moral issue involved: human life must be protected, whatever
the cost. The value of human life cannot be equated to the production of any amount of coal. However, the coal industry can be-and
is-opposed to laws and regulations which fail to improve safety
while unnecessarily reducing production and productivity. There is
little doubt that the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act is
an example of such legislation.
It is difficult to quantify precisely just what impact the Act has
had on coal production and productivity since it went into effect on
March 30, 1970. However, a recent industry survey indicates that
during the first five years of the Act, underground bituminous coal
mines, classified as gassy prior to the Act, experienced a 30 percent
decline in productivity in tons per-unit shift and a corresponding 36
percent reduction in tons per man-day because of compliance with
the Act." For the same period, mines which were not classified as
gassy prior to the Act, experienced a 34 percent drop in tons per
unit-shift and a corresponding 47 percent decline in tons per manday." This same survey also reveals that mines employing all conventional coal mining equipment suffered a greater drop in
productivity than mines using all continuous mining equipment
during the same five-year period. According to this survey, mines
equipped with all conventional equipment lost 25 percent in tons
per unit-shift and a corresponding 44 percent in tons per man-day,
whereas mines using all continuous mining equipment lost 19 percent in tons per unit-shift and 30 percent in tons per man-day.2
21.

Straton, 1970-1974-A Period of Adverse Changes In Productivity and Costs At
MINING CONGRESS JOURNAL, Oct. 1975, at 34, 35
[hereinafter cited as Straton].
22. Id. at 35.
23. Id. at 36. Conventional mining is the cycle of coal mining operations which includes
cutting the coal, drilling blasting holes, loading the holes with explosives and shooting them,
loading the coal and installing roof support. In continuous mining, a continuous mining

Underground Bituminous Coal Mines,
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Consolidation's experience has followed that of the industry, with
studies showing a decrease in productivity of up to 50 percent in
tons per man-day at underground mines.
Changes in mining practices required by the Act have had the
most significant effect on coal production and productivity. The Act
has caused drastic changes in the day-to-day mining operations of
practically every coal mine in this country and has forced coal mine
operators to adopt and use certain operating practices which were
not required prior to the Act. Following are some of the more significant changes in mining practices which have caused a loss of production and productivity, as well as substantially increased costs.
1. Alteration of mining plans to provide additional entries for
separate intake air escapeways. Prior to the Act, conveyor belt and
trolley haulage entries could be and were used as intake air escapeways. The Act prohibits this practice and requires that intake air
escapeways be separated from belt and trolley haulage entries for
the entire length of such entries." Compliance with this provision
requires the driving of additional entries and the construction of
additional permanent stoppings, which adversely affect production
and productivity.
2. Examination of working places for methane gas before electrical equipment is energized. The Act now requires that all areas in
the mine where machinery is or will be working be checked for
methane at the beginning of each shift before electrically operated
equipment is energized. 5 Hence, no work requiring electric equipment can be performed and the start of production is delayed.
3. Permanentsplices. Prior to the Act, coal mine operators were
permitted to make up to five temporary splices in trailing cables of
mining equipment before having to make such splices permanent.
Now, however, operators are permitted to make only one temporary
splice in any trailing cable and such cable can be used for only
twenty-four hours. 6 As a consequence, temporary splices, which can
be made in shorter time and with less loss of production, are not now
normally used.
machine cuts or rips the coal from its in-place position and loads the coal onto a conveyor or
into shuttle cars which transport it. Continuous mining eliminates the drilling, loading and
shooting operations.
24. 30 U.S.C. §§ 877(f)(1), (4) (1970). See also 30 C.F.R. §§ 75.1704, .1707 (1975).
25. 30 U.S.C. § 863(h)(i) (1970). See also 30 C.F.R. §§ 75.307, .307-1 (1975).
26. 30 U.S.C. § 866(d) (1970). See also 30 C.F.R. § 75.603 (1975).
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4. Increased and detailed ventilation requirements. The numerous line curtains and check curtains for ventilation of rooms and
entries now mandated by the Act 7 have required additional labor
for installation and maintenance of such devices, thereby decreasing
productivity. A further loss of production has resulted from the
Act's requirements that line brattice or other ventilation devices be
maintained within ten feet of the face of the coal seam being worked
and that ventilation fans and fan tubing used to remove coal dust
and methane gas be installed before a continuous miner 8 is moved
into the working face area and while the continuous miner is being
withdrawn from the face.29
5. Permissibility examinations of all electric equipment. Much
lost production has resulted from the Act's requirements that all
electric equipment be examined frequently for variations from rigidly fixed standards and that equipment found not to be in compliance with those standards be removed from service or shut down for
immediate repairs.3 0
The above are only a few examples of changes in the Act's requirements which, either alone or in combination with each other, have
necessitated the adoption and use by coal mine operators of mining
practices which were not required or in general use prior to the
passage of the Act.
Other effects which the Act has had on coal production are less
apparent. For example, increased ventilation requirements3' have
reduced the capacity of coal mines to expand coal production without sinking costly air shafts. Any excess air volume which may have
been incorporated into the original design for future mine expansion
has had to be utilized to meet the increased air requirements under
the Act. In some cases, it is not possible, because of a lack of ventilation, to add a new section or two to compensate for the production
lost because of the requirements of the Act. Similarly, mine management no longer has the prerogative to decide when to do certain
things during the production cycle. For example, prior to the enactment of the Act, mine management could wait until the end of a
27. 30 U.S.C. § 863(c) (1970). See also 30 C.F.R. §§ 75.302-.302-2 (1975). Line curtains
and check curtains are sheets of fire-resistant material hung from the roof of a coal mine in
and across entries to direct the flow of air.
28. Continuous miner is defined in note 23 supra.
29. 30 U.S.C. § 863(c) (1970). See also 30 C.F.R. § 75.302-4 (1975).
30. 30 U.S.C. § 865(g) (1970). See also 30 C.F.R. §§ 75.512-.512-2 (1975).
31. 30 U.S.C. § 863 (1970). See also 30 C.F.R. § 75.301 (1975).
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shift or some more convenient time to repair a broken headlight on
a continuous miner or shuttle car. However, under the permissibility requirements of the Act, 2 the headlight must be repaired immediately, and this causes a loss of production while such repair is
being made.
There is no doubt that the potential criminal liability33 of section
foremen, mine foremen and superintendents for violations of the Act
committed by workers under their supervision but over which they
may have no control has affected the production of coal. Because of
their apprehensions about possibly violating the provisions of the
Act, many section foremen, for example, have lost their incentive
and initiative to maintain productivity along with safe working conditions. However, it is not possible to assess the amount of production lost because of this factor.
Most significantly, the loss of production resulting from operational changes required by the Act has correspondingly increased
the development time for a new mine or the expansion of an old one.
Development time for a new mine is now estimated at five to seven
years whereas it was projected at three to five years prior to passage
of the Act.
Substantial coal production has been lost because of the actions
taken by federal coal mine inspectors to enforce the Act. Since the
Act became effective, more than 22,000 closure orders and 430,000
notices of violation have been issued and over 335,000 inspections
have been conducted. 4 Of these enforcement activities, the issuance
of closure orders has been the most costly in terms of lost production. Once a closure order or an order of withdrawal is issued, all
production activities in the designated area must be terminated
immediately and must remain shut down until either an inspector
or another authorized person determines that the condition or the
practice that caused the issuance of the order has been abated."
Whether any particular condition or practice in the coal mine justifies the issuance of such an order is completely within the coal mine
32. 30 U.S.C. § 865(g) (1970). See also 30 C.F.R. § 75.512 (1975).
33. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 819(b), (c) (1970).
34. Statistics, Office of Assistant Administrator, supra note 13. The large number of
notices of violation issued by inspectors has itself caused a loss of production. Many notices
of violation cite conditions or practices which can be corrected only by stopping production
or by taking men away from their production-related activities.
35. 30 U.S.C. §§ 814(a), (b), (c)(1), (c)(2) (1970).
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inspector's discretion. Although an operator may obtain administrative review of any closure order issued by a federal coal mine
inspector under section 105 of the Act, 36 this review does not provide
any real or immediate remedy for the operator. The only relief which
an operator can obtain in an application for a review proceeding is
to have the closure order vacated because it was improperly or invalidly issued. No relief is available to the coal mine operator for any
coal production lost because of the issuance of such order. Hence,
whenever an inspector issues a closure order, coal mine operators
have little choice but to take whatever action is required to abate
the condition. Coal mine operators who have obtained review of
closure orders under section 105 have done so to obtain judicial
guidance as to those conditions or practices for which a closure order
may properly be issued.
Furthermore, the number of inspections of each coal mine has
increased drastically since the Act went into effect, and this too has
caused a loss of production. Inspectors frequently interrupt coal
production activities to inspect equipment and other conditions or
to talk to the workers. The mere presence of an inspector undoubtedly impairs the productivity of workers. The high number of
inspections has necessitated the hiring by coal companies of additional workers to escort inspectors during their inspections.

IV.

THE NEED FOR AN IMPROVED MINE SAFETY LAW

There is no doubt that the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act of 1969 has failed in its primary objective: to improve mine
safety. There is also no doubt that it has resulted in an unnecessary
and unjustified reduction in coal production and in worker productivity, and has substantially increased costs. These conclusions do
not imply that more safety legislation is needed. On the contrary,
they indicate that mine safety cannot simply be legislated. Without
doubt, some provisions of the Act are beneficial, resulting in improved health and safety conditions in coal mines. These provisions,
however, are far outnumbered by others which are of no benefit and
which, in fact, are counter-productive at a critical juncture in our
nation's efforts to develop and supply increasing amounts of energy.
It is absolutely essential that Congress reconsider this legislation
36.

Id. § 815.
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in view of the industry's experiences during the past six years. It is
essential that Congress understand the coal industry's position: that
it is not opposed to reasonable legislation and regulations which
produce positive safety results, and that it will work untiringly with
government and with the United Mine Workers of America to forge
proper legislation.
Proper amendments to the law can only come about through an
item-by-item reassessment, excising those provisions which experience has shown do not result in improved health and safety but
which instead reduce production and productivity, and retaining
those provisions which experience has shown do improve health and
safety, regardless of their effect on production and productivity.
Amendments to the law must realistically be addressed to the training and motivation of workers, which experience has shown is the
best insurance against mining accidents. Strong consideration
should be given to making all mineworkers accountable for their
actions while engaged in mine work. Beyond the prohibition of
smoking in underground mines, miners cannot now be held accountable for their actions which endanger themselves and their fellow
miners. The industry firmly believes that an overwhelming percentage of mine accidents is caused by the negligent acts of miners.
Accountability of the coal miner for his actions should be contingent
upon completion of extensive job and safety training and certification.
In view of the experience of the last six years of enforcement and
in light of what the industry believes to be the highly arbitrary
actions of inspectors in issuing closure orders, the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969 must be amended to restrict the
' 37
authority of inspectors to close a mine when no "imminent danger
can be proven. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
(OSHA),3 1 which regulates the safety of all occupations other than
coal mining, requires a court order before a closure notice can be
issued.39 In addition, OSHA inspectors are given discretionary
power under which they can issue warnings without actually citing
violations. 0 Under the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, inspectors
are required to cite each violation. 4 (It is impossible to operate a
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. § 8026).
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970).
Id. § 662(a).
Id. § 658(a).
30 U.S.C. §§ 814(b), (c)(2) (1970).
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coal mine economically without violations occurring). The result is
that mine operators are found in violation and fined, without a
showing of fault or negligence, in thousands of situations where the
condition may be easily and quickly abated. Federal coal mine
inspectors should be granted discretion as to what conditions they
cite as violations, and coal operators should not be fined unless they
are found to be negligent or at fault for causing a violation.
A greater atmosphere of cooperation between inspectors and mine
management must be fostered. Both parties basically are pursuing
the same result-improved mine safety. But the manner and
method of this pursuit by federal inspectors often is wholly out-ofline with the intent of the Act. Moreover, there is an unnecessary
and costly duplication of effort by federal inspectors, who are enforcing the federal Act, and state inspectors, who are responsible for
enforcing the state mine safety laws. This constitutes regulatory
"overkill" that has seriously impaired production and productivity.
There is much room for improvement in the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969 and, until proper amendments to the
Act are signed into law, the Act will not be the basis for significant
improvement in mine safety, nor will the coal industry's prospects
for meeting the energy demands of the nation be enhanced.

